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Greece & the Odious Debt Doctrine
INTRODUCTION
Sovereign debt and subsequent repayment problems are
not recent phenomena. In fact, the first sovereign default may
date as far back as “the fourth century B.C., when ten out of
thirteen Greek municipalities . . . defaulted on [their] loans
from the Delos Temple.”1 Sovereign default is not only an
ancient occurrence, but it is also a historically pervasive and
enduring one. While the sixteenth century observed a
particular prevalence of sovereign debt restructurings and
defaults,2 the nineteenth century witnessed a significantly
widespread and recurrent eruption of national debt crises.3
Indeed, given the longevity and frequency of sovereign debt
problems, it may be curious that our modern world still
struggles to resolve these issues as much as it does.
When confronted with the problem of struggling
sovereign debtors, perhaps one of the creditor’s most
challenging tasks is to determine where to demand one’s dues
and where to acquiesce. An annual report of the U.N.
Commission for International Law reflects on this issue:
A state cannot . . . be expected to close its schools and universities and
its courts, to disband its police force and to neglect its public services
to such an extent as to expose its community to chaos and anarchy
merely to provide the money wherewith to meet its moneylenders,
foreign or national. There are limits to what may be reasonably
expected of a State in the same manner as with an individual.4

1

FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND
LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 3 (2006) (citing MAX WINKLER, FOREIGN BONDS,
AN AUTOPSY: A STUDY OF DEFAULTS AND REPUDIATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
22 (1933)).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
Special Rapportuer on State Responsibility, Addendum—Eighth Report on
State Responsibility; The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of
International Responsibility, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7
(Feb. 29, 1980; June 10, 19, 1980) (by Robert Ago), reprinted in [1980] Y.B. Int’l
Comm’n, 23-24, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/333 (Part 1) (citations omitted), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_315.pdf (comment from South
African Government).
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This touches upon a key issue: at the point when a
creditor is dealing with a financially unstable sovereign debtor,
the creditor must re-examine the reasonableness of its
expectations of repayment and adjust accordingly.
Today, over two millennia after its Delos Temple event
marked sovereign default history, the state of Greece steps
back into the debt spotlight. The Greek debt crisis began to
attract notice in late 2009, and by 2012, Greece had experienced a
widening of bond yield spreads,5 downgrading of their bond
rating,6 and two bailout loans from the International Monetary
Fund (“IMF”) and the Eurozone countries,7 conditional on harsh
austerity measures.8 Before the last bailout loan took place, great
concern existed that Greece would lose its already unstable
economic footing and plunge into default by mid-March 2012.9
One theoretical solution to resolve Greek’s debt crisis is
the doctrine of odious debt, which has attracted significant
attention from the internet and other media outlets.10 While the
5

GEORGIOS P. KOURETAS, THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS: ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS 2 (2012), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/cenfis/eventscf/
11sov_debt_Kouretas.pdf; see also Dave Kansas, Greek Bond Yield Spreads Widen,
Restructuring Chatter Grows, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/
marketbeat/2011/04/27/greek-bond-yield-spreads-widen-restructuring-chatter-grows/.
6
Deepa Babington & Harry Papachristou, Fitch Downgrades Greece on Debt
Swap Plan, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/greecefitch-idINDEE81L0CP20120222.
7
The “Eurozone” refers to the collective body of European Union countries which
have adopted the euro as their currency. As of June 2013, the Eurozone consisted 17
member states. See generally EUROZONE PORTAL, www.eurozone.europa.eu.
8
See Katie Allen et al., Eurozone Debt Crisis: Greek Timeline, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/oct/31/eurozone-debt-crisisgreece-crisis-timeline; see also Lesley Wroughton, UPDATE 2-IMF Approves New Greek
Bailout, Warns on Missteps, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/03/15/imf-greece-idUSL2E8EF5DV20120315.
9
Greece was scheduled to tender a bond payment on March 20, 2012, and
prior to the second rescue package, there existed doubt that Greece would be able to
honor this payment. See Adam Ewing & Marcus Bensasson, Greece Is Insolvent, Will
Default on Debt: Fitch, BLOOMBERG (Jan 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-01-17/greece-is-insolvent-will-default-on-its-debt-fitch-says.html. For example,
Fitch Ratings, who had downgraded Greece’s credit ratings “to CCC, seven levels below
investment grade,” was among these skeptics. Id. “The so-called private sector
involvement, for us, would count as a default, it clearly is a default in our book,” Fitch
Ratings Managing Director Edward Parker reported, “[s]o it won’t be a surprise when
the Greek default actually happens and we expect it one way or the other to be
relatively soon.” Id.
10
For example, proponents of cancelling Greece’s debt have created Facebook
pages to the cause. See Cancel Illegitimate and Odious Debt: The Case for Greece,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Cancel-Illegitimate-and-Odious-Debt-theCase-for-Greece/102260499854294 (last visited June 29, 2013); see also Greece Debt
Free, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/GreeceDebtFree (last visited June 29,
2013). An additional example is the book published by Jason Manolopoulos, advocating
for Greece’s adoption of the odious debt doctrine. See generally JASON MANOLOPOULOS,
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odious debt doctrine has not yet formally entered the systems
of international law,11 it finds its momentum through its
practical and moral principles.12 The doctrine of odious debt is
based on the concept that “the debt [that] despots incur should
not form a continuing obligation for states emerging from the
grips of a despotic government, at least to the extent that the
debt did not benefit the population that existed under the prior
regime.”13 The generally accepted definition of “odious debt” is
debt which was incurred without the consent of the people,
which did not benefit the people, and which the creditors knew
was odious.14 Accordingly, under the doctrine, if a debt is shown
to be odious, it may be cancelled altogether.15 This note seeks to
analyze the odious debt doctrine within the context of Greece’s
debt crisis: that is, whether the odious debt doctrine should be
applied at all, and if it should be, whether Greece’s debt falls
within the doctrine’s meaning of “odious.”
This analysis concludes that Greece should not be
released of its repayment obligations under the odious debt
theory, based on three primary findings: (1) at a universal
GREECE’S “ODIOUS” DEBT (2011). Also, the results generated by a Google search of
Greece and odious debt demonstrate the plethora of news commentaries, periodicals,
private blogs, and public forums that exist to debate the issue.
11
See Bradley N. Lewis, Restructuring The Odious Debt Exception, 25 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 297, 298 (2007); see also Robert Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public
International Law 6-7, 9 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/
osgdp20074_en.pdf. The only international convention that addresses debt repayment
is the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, which contemplated but ultimately rejected a proposal to
incorporate “odious debt” into the Convention’s definition of “State debt.” See id. at 9;
see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-third
Session, 36 GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A/36/10 (1981) reprinted in [1981] Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n, 78-80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1981/Add.1 (Part 2). The International
Law Commission rejected the proposal on the basis that “the definition of State debt
should be limited to financial obligations arising at the international level, that is to
say, between subjects of international law” and, in contrast, the “[d]ebts owed by a
State to private creditors . . . fell outside the scope of the present draft.” Id at 79-80.
The International Law Commission concluded instead that it “was of the
opinion . . . that the rules formulated for each type of succession of States might well
settle the issues raised.” Id. at 79.
12
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 298.
13
Christiana Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the
Externalities of A Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 109, 109-10 (2008).
14
See Lee C. Buchheit et al., The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J.
1201, 1218 (2007); see also Jeff A. King, Odious Debt: The Terms of the Debate, 32 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 605, 606 (2007) (citing Jeff King, The Odious Debt Doctrine in
International Law: Definition and Evidence, in Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan
Thomas, Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 13-52 (CISDL Working Paper No.
COM/RES/ESJ, 2003), available at http://www.cisdl.org/pdf/debtentire.pdf).
15
See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1218.
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level, the odious debt doctrine should not be applied because of
its critical inherent doctrinal and administrative failings; (2)
even if the odious debt doctrine were applied, the serious policy
risks that accompany its use mandate a narrow interpretation
of the doctrine, so as to limit its reach to only exceptional cases;
and (3) under a narrow interpretation of the odious debt
doctrine, Greece would not be eligible to cancel its debt.
Parts I through III of this note will present the
background information necessary for analyzing Greece’s
sovereign debt. Part I will examine some of the problematic
characteristics of sovereign debt generally, which set the
sovereign apart from other debtors. Part II will lay out a timeline
of Greece’s debt history. Part III will introduce the doctrine of
odious debts by presenting the doctrine’s elements, underlying
principles, and history of use.
Parts IV, V, and VI will analyze the substance of the
odious debt doctrine and its application to Greece’s situation
specifically. Part IV will first introduce the fundamental
problems of the odious debt doctrine—its doctrinal deficiencies
and administrative shortcomings—showing how the doctrine
fails as a workable rule. These findings counsel against the use
of the doctrine altogether. Part V will break down the doctrine
into two categories—“odious debt” and “odious regime”—and will
explain how those terms produce liberal and narrow applications
of the doctrine. This Part will proceed to introduce the serious
policy problems that a liberal approach implicates, and will
conclude that therefore only the narrow interpretation is
warranted. Lastly, Part VI will place this analysis within the
context of Greece specifically. First, this Part will apply the
narrow and liberal interpretations of the odious debt doctrine to
Greece’s situation, ultimately finding that Greece would not be
eligible under the narrow interpretation and accordingly should
not repudiate its debts. Finally, in offering some alternatives to
the odious debt doctrine, this Part will recommend some other
solutions for Greece to resolve its debt crisis.
I.

THE CONUNDRUM OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBTOR

As one commentator points out: “[S]overeign debt is a
very different ‘animal’ from normal debt.”16 IBISWorld, a
16

“Kleingut,” Lessons to be Learned from the Greek Past, BLOGSPOT (Jan. 24,
2012, 1:41 PM), http://klauskastner.blogspot.com/2012/01/lessons-to-be-learned-from-greekpast.html.
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market research organization, opined that “there is no clear-cut
solution to the problem” of the sovereign debt crisis.17 What is
the nature of sovereign debt such that it obscures clear-cut
solutions from view and sets the sovereign apart from other
debtors? This Part will investigate that question.
A.

Enforcement Problems

One aspect of sovereign debt that makes the sovereign
unique among debtors is the lack of an enforcement scheme for
compelling a sovereign to repay. The following analysis will
investigate two particular phenomena that restrict a creditor’s
ability to enforce repayment of a sovereign loan: namely, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the sovereign’s lack of
seizeable assets.
First, the concept of “sovereign immunity” is a
significant obstacle to compelling a sovereign to repay, because
this doctrine essentially provides the state with a shield to ward
off creditors from obtaining an enforceable judgment. Sovereign
immunity is an “undisputed principle of customary international
law,”18 which generally immunizes a sovereign state from the
jurisdiction of a foreign state’s courts.19 Since sovereign immunity
generally protects the sovereign from both criminal and civil
liability,20 this doctrine presents a significant obstacle for creditors
seeking satisfaction of their debts through judicial intervention.
Despite widespread recognition of the principle of
sovereign immunity, no general consensus has been reached as
to how it should be applied in international law,21 and there is
17

TOON VAN BEECK, BE AWARE AND PREPARED: A SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS IS
NEAR 3 (June 2010), available at http://www.ibisworld.com/Common/MediaCenter/
Special%20Report%20June%20Sovereign%20Debt.pdf.
18
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, [Ch. 5, introductory note] (1986); see also TOM MCNAMARA, A PRIMER ON
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1 (2006), available at http://www.dgslaw.com/documents/
articles/McNamara1.pdf.
19
See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (finding that
“[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute” and “is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself”).
20
Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S.
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 214. But many
states have enacted restrictive versions of the sovereign immunity laws that limit the
protection of criminal liability when the transgression involved a violation of human
rights. For a more extensive discussion, see Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law
of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2687-2703 (2011).
21
See Stephens, supra note 20, at 2691 (finding that “[t]he limited domestic
and international codification [of sovereign immunity] exacerbates the lack of clarity as
to the rules governing sovereign immunity,” and that any existing domestic
codifications vary between an “absolute” form and a “restrictive doctrine,” the latter of
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moreover very limited domestic codification of the rules
governing this doctrine.22 While two international treaties have
been drafted on the subject, neither has received enough
signatures to be enacted and enforced.23 As a result, sovereign
immunity principles are generally governed by “uncodified
domestic rules, often focused on domestic interpretations of
customary international law, as filtered through each [nation’s]
constitutional and judicial doctrines.”24 Thus, while the principle
of sovereign immunity in itself presents an imposing obstacle in a
creditor’s way, the additional lack of uniformity among sovereign
immunity codes further complicates repayment enforcement.
Although sovereign immunity creates a formidable
hurdle for sovereign debt enforcement, other obstacles to
collection exist that also serve to distinguish sovereigns from
other debtors. For example, the recourse of seizing the debtor’s
assets is much more difficult and complicated with sovereign
debtors. To illustrate this concept, consider the seizure of a
corporate debtor’s assets. If a corporation fails to repay its debt,
unpaid creditors can seek satisfaction by dismantling the
business entirely and using the proceeds to pay back the
debts.25 The result is similar in the context of an individual
debtor, where a creditor can pursue repayment by acquiring a
court order commanding the individual debtor to pay or
permitting a seizure of the debtor’s assets to satisfy the debt.
But no parallel repayment scheme exists in the case of the
sovereign debtor. While a corporation may be dissolved to satisfy
debts, “no creditor has the ability to dismantle or liquidate a
which “has led to an ‘extraordinary complexity and variety in the emerging rules,’ with
consensus ‘only at a rather high level of abstraction’”).
22
See id. (finding that “[v]ery few states even have domestic statutes
governing foreign sovereign immunity”).
23
One of these treaties, The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, will come into force when thirty states have
ratified it. See The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property, U.N. Doc A/59/38, Art. 30 Dec. 2, 2004; Stephens, supra note 20, at
2692 n.143. As of June 2013, only fourteen states had become parties to the treaty
(Austria, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Norway, Portugal,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). For the status of
ratifications, see U.N. Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited
June 29, 2013). The other treaty, The European Convention on State Immunity, has been
ratified by only eight states as of June 2013. For the status of its ratifications. See The
European Convention on State Immunity, E.T.S. 074, 11 I.L.M. 470, May 16, 1972,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG
(last visited June 29, 2013).
24
Stephens, supra note 20, at 2692.
25
See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2004).
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country.”26 And unlike the seizure of an individual debtor’s
assets, the seizure of a sovereign’s assets would involve an
extremely political and complex—if not impossible—process.
B.

Successive Debt & Non-Financial Priorities: An Unusual
Combination

In addition to the enforcement problems associated with
sovereign debt, another unique disadvantage for creditors is
that sovereign debt features an unusual and problematic
combination of individual and corporate debt characteristics. That
is, on one hand, the sovereign debtor’s priorities with respect to
repayment resemble an individual debtor’s, while the successive
nature of sovereign debt reflects corporate debt. In order to
demonstrate how this combination puts creditors at an unusual
disadvantage, each of these features will be explained in turn.
In terms of the sovereign debtor’s priorities when it
comes to repayment, sovereign debt is more analogous to
individual debt than to corporate debt.27 Understanding this
concept requires a look at corporate and individual debtors
specifically. On one hand, a corporation is essentially an
“investment vehicle” for its shareholders, meaning that the
decisions for the life of the corporation are based entirely on the
goal of obtaining investor returns.28 For this reason, when faced
with corporate bankruptcy, a corporate debtor would rather
repay its debt by liquidating assets than face default.29 An
individual debtor, on the other hand, would likely prioritize her
quality of life and would rather opt for an “opportunistic
default” than give up certain benefits, such as decent shelter, a
cell-phone plan, or clothing for her children.30 Similarly, a
sovereign state does not view its debt options through the lens of
obtaining profits and investment returns like a corporation, but
instead considers political, social, and economic consequences.31
Like the individual debtor, the sovereign debtor will also likely
choose an “opportunistic default” before turning to drastic
26

Id. at 1487.
Adam Brenneman, Comment, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal
Bankruptcy, and a Comprehensive Contractual Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 651 (2006).
28
See id. at 658 & n.36 (citing Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of
the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 1163 (2004)
(“describing corporations as investment vehicles in a discussion that distinguished
sovereigns and corporations”)).
29
Id. at 657-59.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 658-59.
27
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measures to finance repayment such as cutting social programs
or depleting environmental and cultural resources.32
In another respect, however, the sovereign debtor is
most analogous to the corporate debtor, since both sovereign
and corporate debt do not have the option of debt cancellation
after an average adult life as individual debt does. In other
words, Uncle Rob’s gambling debts extinguish at his death and
do not pass on to his successors. In contrast, corporate debts are
“adhesive” in that the corporation’s debts continue indefinitely
until repayment, regardless how many times the board of
directors changes management, the corporation changes
shareholders, or the corporation is sold to another entity.33
Similarly, no matter how many times power changes hands or the
government changes forms, a sovereign’s debt also persists.34
Thus, sovereign debt is also remarkably adhesive and, in this
way, more closely resembles corporate than individual debt.
This adhesiveness allows the sovereign debt to
perpetually linger—even as the sovereign continues to borrow
from other creditors—which poses some risks to the creditor.
For example, the state of Kenya still owes debts that date back
as far back as 1971 and which are not scheduled for full
repayment until 2052.35 The longevity of these debts span
almost double the adult period of a human life;36 thus, were the
state of Kenya an individual debtor, the loans may have been
cancelled twice over in that timeframe. Moreover, sovereign
debtors may likely continue to accrue additional creditors by
increasing their borrowing in order to meet public needs and
existing obligations.37 A creditor of sovereign debt, therefore,
potentially faces increased competition for repayment, since
32

Id.
Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1207.
34
See id.
35
Alphonce Shiundu, Kenya: Red Flag Raised Over Debts From AngloLeasing, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 1, 2011), allafrica.com/stories/201108020085.html.
36
For the purposes of this note, the “adult period of a human life” calculates
to approximately 48-52 years. This is from the viewpoint that one’s adult life begins
around 20 years old (that is, when an individual is likely adult enough to contract a
debt), and ends around 68-72 years old, which is the global life expectancy according to
a 2011 study. See Tom Miles, Global Life Expectancy: Life Spans Continue To Lengthen
Around The World, WHO Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2013)
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/15/global-life-expectancy-spanworld_n_3281211.html.
37
For example, since 2009, five countries in the Eurozone—Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus—have had to borrow money from other European
countries and the IMF in order to avoid defaulting on their existing debts. See
Associated Press, Eurozone’s 5 bailout packages at a glance, FINANCIAL POST (Mar. 25,
2013), http://business.financialpost.com/2013/03/25/cyprus-bailout-eurozone-rescue/.
33
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not only will the sovereign debtor be simultaneously repaying
all loans, longevity thereof notwithstanding, but additional
creditors may likely continue to accrue.
Thus, a creditor faces unusual risk by lending to a
sovereign because repayment is threatened by the dual hazard of
(1) the sovereign’s increased disincentive to repay the debt because
of the state’s non-financial (e.g. social, cultural, environmental)
priorities, a risk also not present with corporate borrowers, and (2)
increased competition by other creditors because of the successive
nature of the sovereign’s debt, a risk that does not exist with
individual borrowers. These challenges present an unusual
conundrum for concerned creditors and struggling sovereign
debtors as they seek solutions to debt repayment.
The doctrine of odious debt aims to tackle the problem of
sovereign debt repayment, at least in part, by providing the
state with an “easy way out” when the debts are “odious.”
II.

A TIMELINE OF GREECE’S DEBT

A sovereign debtor who has recently stepped into a
media spotlight is the state of Greece. Before this note can
consider Greece’s economic situation through the lens of the
odious debt doctrine, an understanding of Greece’s debt crisis,
especially the source and nature of Greece’s debt itself, is
required. This Part will begin by presenting a timeline of
Greece’s financial history, which introduces the origins and
application of Greece’s debts. These facts are especially
important because they inform key elements of the odious debt
doctrine. This Part will then recount Greece’s interaction with
the European Union (the “EU”) on issues concerning Greece’s
deficit—namely, Greece’s initial efforts to conceal the deficit
from the European Union before ultimately revealing it—and
then will conclude by describing the international and domestic
reactions to Greece’s attempts to resolve its debt crisis.
A.

When and How Greece Used Its Debt: 1970–2009

Increased public debt has been a “feature of the Greek
economy” since the late 1970s. At that time, public debt was
only 25 percent of Greece’s gross domestic product (“GDP”), and
the government borrowed externally only for purposes of
investment.38 This changed in 1981, however, when a socialist
38

See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4.
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government came into power.39 At that point, Greece began
spending “to boost consumption in an effort to raise the living
standard of Greeks.”40 During the same time, however, Greece
was experiencing a period of stagflation caused by the 1979 oil
shock,41 which persisted from 1981-1983.42 Because of the
government’s public spending during a period of stagnant
economic growth, the Greece government resorted to heavy
borrowing through the early to mid-1980s to stop the resulting
rising deficits in the public sector.43 Starting at 25% in 1980,
the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 80% by the end of that decade.44
“This upward trend continued” until it reached 110% during
1993, but then experienced a short plateau due to the Treaty of
Maastricht’s influence.45
By 1994, the Treaty of Maastricht (formally, the Treaty
of Maastricht on European Union) had been in effect for two
years, which called for the establishment of the European
Monetary Union (EMU).46 Under this treaty, the EU allowed
only those states whose total sovereign debt fell below 60% of
GDP to join the Eurozone, among other requirements.47 In an
effort to qualify, the newly-elected socialist government in
Greece effected a stabilization program in 1994 to stop the rise
of Greece’s debt, resulting in a “steady public debt-to-GDP ratio
at 110%” over the following five years.48 In 2001, although
Greece still did not meet the qualifying standards, Greece
39

Id.
Id.
41
See George Alogoskoufis, Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crisis: Retrospect and
Prospect, 16 (Hellenic Observatory, European Institute, Hellenic Observatory Papers
on Greece and Southeast Europe No.54, 2012), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/
europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/Gre
eSE-No54.pdf.
42
See id. at 12.
43
Greece—Overview of economy, ENCYCLOPEDIA NATIONS (last visited Apr.
17, 2013), http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Europe/Greece-OVERVIEWOF-ECONOMY.html.
44
See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4.
45
Id.
46
See Joshua M. Wepman, Article 104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty and
European Monetary Union: Does Ireland Hold the Key to Success?, 19 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 247, 247 (1996).
47
See id. at 251-52 & n.38, see also Treaty on European Union, 35 O.J.E.C.
92/c 224/01, 224/35 & 24/120 (Aug. 31, 1992), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:FULL:EN:PDF
(stating
that “Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits” by not exceeding a
“reference value,” subject to some exceptions, and providing “reference values” to be
“3% for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product
at market prices;” and “60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product
at market prices”).
48
See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 4.
40
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managed to join the Eurozone nonetheless by deceitfully
submitting incorrect statistics.49
Generally, adoption of the euro proved to be particularly
beneficial to the interest rates of countries like Greece, who
hitherto had experienced “high levels of inflation and a lack of
economic policy credibility.”50 The ability to borrow in euros
produced substantially lower interest rates. For example,
during the 1990s, Greece faced interest rates between 10% to
18%, but after Greece’s entrance to the Eurozone, interest rate
fell dramatically to 2%–3%.51 Taking advantage of these
significantly lower interest rates, the Greek government
started borrowing heavily in the years following its admission
to the Eurozone while at the same time increasing government
spending.52 Between 2001 and 2009, the Greece government
“ran fiscal deficits of 6% of GDP on . . . average,”53 while its
debt-to-GDP ratio remained around 100%, which was
abnormally high for a Eurozone member.54 Among other
increases to social programs, the Greek government used these
funds to almost double public sector workers’ wages.55
Considering that Greece’s public sector accounts for about 40%
of GDP and that wages in Greece’s public sector are on average
almost one and half times higher than in the private sector, these
wage increases reflected substantial government spending.56 Also,
Greece provided the public with a pension equating to 92% of
their pre-retirement salary, “one of the most generous pension
systems in the world.”57 Additionally, Greece was spending a
substantial percentage of its GDP on its military.58
The 2004 Athens Olympic Games also accounted for
significant government spending. In preparation for this world
49

See Allen et al., supra note 8.
See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 2.
51
See Harry Wallop, Greece: Why Did Its Economy Fall So Hard?,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/
7646320/Greece-why-did-its-economy-fall-so-hard.html.
52
See Q&A: Greece’s Economic Woes, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8508136.stm.
53
See KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 3.
54
See Alogoskoufis, supra note 41, at 11.
55
See Wallop, supra note 51; Kent Osband, Greece’s Toxic Cure, EUR. FIN.
REV. (Apr 17, 2012), http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=5014.
56
See CIA, Greece, WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2012); Greece Program, IMF Board
Approves 28 Billion Loan for Greece, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/CAR031512B.htm.
57
See Wallop, supra note 51.
58
In 2005, an estimated 4.3 percent of GDP accounted for military
expenditures, the twenty-second highest in the world. See CIA, supra note 56.
50
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event,
the
Greek
government
improved
Athens’s
infrastructure,59 funded increases in exceptionally strong
security systems (given the heightened security alarm due to
the recent 9/11 tragedy), and made the traditional effort to outdo previous hosts in terms of the Games’ presentation.60 As a
whole, the government spending involved in the Olympic
project proved substantial, leading to Prime Minister Costas
Karamanlis’s bleak 2004 comment: “The public debt exceeds
even the most pessimistic of estimations.”61
By 2009, 54% of Greece’s GDP was spent on general
government expenses,62 such as military defense, public order,
hospital services, housing, and community amenities.63 In fact,
21.6% of its GDP was spent on social security funds alone, a
percentage slightly higher than that of major industrial
countries such as Belgium and Germany.64
B.

Greece and the Eurozone: Concealing and Exposing
the Deficit

During its early membership of the EU, the Greek
government used extensive and underhanded measures to hide
the true extent of its deficit from the rest of the Eurozone.
Starting in 2002, Greece’s debt managers worked with bankers
of U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs to effect a complex
“cross-currency swap, in which government debt issued in
dollars and yen was swapped for euro debt for a certain period—
to be exchanged back into the original currencies at a later
date.”65 While such transactions are a traditional part of
government financing, the Greek government “devised a special
kind of swap with fictional exchange rates” that effectively
59

Nick Malkoutzis, How the 2004 Olympics Triggered Greece’s Decline,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201208-02/how-the-2004-olympics-triggered-greeces-decline.
60
Greek Debt Spirals After Olympics, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3649268.stm.
61
Id.
62
European Commission, General Government Expenditure by Function
(COFOG), EUROPEAN COMMISSION: EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/
show.do?dataset=gov_a_exp&lang=en (from drop-down menu “sector,” select “general
government”) (last updated Sept. 5, 2013).
63
European Commission, Glossary: General Government Sector—Statistics
Explained, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: EUROSTAT, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_
explained/index.php/Glossary:General_government#.
64
European Commission, supra note 62 (from drop-down menu “sector,”
select “social security funds”).
65
Beat Balzli, How Goldman Sachs Helped Greece to Mask its True Debt,
SPIEGEL (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676634,00.html.
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enabled the government to hide its liabilities from the rest of the
Eurozone until a later date.66
In December 2009, George Papandreou’s Socialists won
a general election in Greece, a victory largely attributable to
the people’s anger at the previous government for its failure to
effectively tackle public corruption and the sinking economy.67
The same month, Fitch and Moody reduced the Greek debt
rating from A- to BBB+, marking the first time in a decade that
Greek sovereign debt rating dropped below A-.68 In February
2010, George Pandreou revised the 2009 deficit from the
previously under-reported 5% to a startling 12.7% of GDP.69
The final revised calculation by Eurostat ultimately brought
the number up even further to an alarming 15.8% of GDP.70
The following April, Fitch and Moody nicked their rating of
Greek sovereign debt down to BBB-, just one level away from
“junk” status,71 followed that same month by Standard & Poor,
who slashed Greek debt to a stunning BB+ rating—the upper
levels of “junk.”72 These reductions in Greek debt ratings incited
alarm in the financial markets and led to high bond yields.73
Since 2010, both the Greek government and other
agencies, such as the EU and the IMF, have taken measures to
stabilize Greece financially. In 2010, Papandreou’s administration
announced the implementation of a number of austerity
66

The “special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates” that Goldman
Sachs devised for Greece “enabled Greece to receive a far higher sum than the actual
euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. In that way Goldman Sachs secretly
arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks. This credit disguised as a
swap didn’t show up in the Greek debt statistics.” Id. For further information on how
the “currency swap” works, see id.
67
See Rachel Donadio & Anthee Carassava, Greek Socialists Win in a
Landslide, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/world/
europe/05greece.html. Regarding corruption, a 2010 study by Transparency
International (the Berlin-based global “corruption watchdog”) found that the Greeks
paid an average of 1,355 ($1,830) in bribes that year for services from the public
sector. See Greek Corruption Booming, Says Transparency International, SPIEGEL
(Mar.
2,
2010,
11:06
AM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/
0,1518,681184,00.html.
68
See Graeme Wearden, Greece Debt Crisis: Timeline, GUARDIAN (May 5,
2010), www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/05/greece-debt-crisis-timeline.
69
See A Very European Crisis, ECONOMIST (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/15452594?story_id=15452594.
70
See Numbers in Action, ECONOMIST NEWSWEEK BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/11/greek-statistics.
71
See Gary Dorsch, Greek Debt Wildfire Engulfs the Euro in Flames, Boosts Gold,
MKT. ORACLE (May 13, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article19468.html.
72
See Dorsch, supra note 71; Lefteris Papadimas & Dave Graham, S&P Cuts Greek
Debt to Junk, Downgrades Portugal, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2010), www.reuters.com/article/
2010/04/27/us-greece-idUSLDE63P0LU20100427.
73
See Dorsch, supra note 71; KOURETAS, supra note 5, at 2.
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packages.74 By 2011, the EU and the IMF had offered Greece two
bailout loans, both conditional on harsh austerity measures for
the county.75 The second bailout loan was finally ratified in 2012
and was conditioned on restructuring packages from Greece’s
private creditors.76
C.

International and Domestic Reception to Greece’s Debt
Crisis

Public fear of a default by Greece greatly increased just
prior to Greece’s first bailout package77 and again after Greece
failed to meet the goals set out in that package a year later.78
According to the Wall Street Journal, in May 2010, the credit
market found there was a 75% chance of Greece defaulting.79 In
September 2011, “a poll of more than 50 economists across
Europe” gave Greece a 65% chance that it would default within
twelve months.80
Following Greece’s self-imposed austerity measures in
early May 2010, the resulting cuts in public spending received
widespread disapproval from the Greek population, leading to
violent protests beginning in May 201081 and continuing
through 201182 and into 2012.83 Among the calls for action by
these protestors, many objected to the bailout offers from the
EU and IMF84 and instead demanded a cancellation of Greece’s

74

See Allen et al., supra note 8.
See id.; see also Wroughton, supra note 8.
76
See Wroughton, supra note 8.
77
Aaron Smith, Greek Debt Fears Ease After EU Aid Request, CNN MONEY.COM
(Apr. 23, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/23/news/international/greek_
bonds_prime_minister.
78
Emelia Sithole-Matarise, Bond Market Sees High Risk of Eventual Greek
Default, REUTERS (June 13, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/
13/uk-markets-greece-idUKTRE75C3HD20110613.
79
Mark Whitehouse, Number of the Week: 75% Chance of Greek Default,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 22, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2010/05/22/
number-of-the-week-75-chance-of-greek-default.
80
Jonathan Cable & Andy Bruce, Greece Looks Likely to Default, But Keep Euro,
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2011, 7:42 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/idINIndia59386520110916.
81
Greece Police Tear Gas Anti-Austerity Protesters, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8655711.stm.
82
See Rachel Donadio & Niki Kitsantonis, Thousands in Greece Protest New
Austerity Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/20/world/europe/greek-workers-start-two-day-anti-austerity-strike.html.
83
See Helena Smith, Greek Protesters Fight with Police as Parliament Agrees
Cuts Deal, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/12/
greek-protesters-clash-parliament-austerity.
84
See Greece Police Tear Gas Anti-Austerity Protesters, supra note 81.
75
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debt altogether.85 2013 witnessed a less violent but nonetheless
economically damaging protest as Greece’s two main labor
unions, representing about 2.5 million workers, called a 24-hour
strike, affecting schools, public transportation, and hospital staff.86
Nevertheless, the Greek government continued to work with the
EU and IMF to avoid default despite these protests.87
At the time of the writing of this note, Greece has
experienced some positive economic trends—including a
striking increase in Greece’s major stock index, a lift of
Greece’s seventeen-month ban on short-selling in stocks, and a
positive direction for Greek corporate bond sales88—which may
suggest a return of investor confidence in Greece.89 In a
February 2013 article, the Wall Street Journal proposed that
such economic confidence in Greece may signal a “possible
turning point in the country’s three-year-long debt crisis.”90
Even then, however, the Wall Street Journal was reluctant to
be too optimistic, observing that “[t]o be sure, it could all go
sour again, should social or political tensions erupt anew and
derail the fragile [reform program].”91
III.

INTRODUCTION TO THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
If we were all responsible for the misdeeds of the governments that
represent us, thought Isabel, then the moral burden would be just
too great.92

The odious debt doctrine should be viewed most
appropriately as a qualification on, or exception to, the general
rule that sovereign entities must pay the debts of predecessor
governments.93 Before the odious debt doctrine, other exceptions
85

See id.; see also Greek Debt Audit Campaign, Greek Debt Audit Campaign
Statement, JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/
Greek3720Debt3720Audit3720Campaign3720statement+7476.twl.
86
Niki Kitsantonis, Greece: Strikers Protest over Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2013, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/europe/greekunions-walk-out-in-austerity-protest.html.
87
See CNN Wire Staff, Greek Lawmakers Pass New Austerity Law Despite
Protests, CNN NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/
20/business/greece-austerity-strikes/index.html; see also Greece Timeline, BBC NEWS
(Mar. 12, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1014812.stm.
88
See Stelios Bouras & Philip Pangalos, Foreign Money Is Revisiting Greece,
WALL ST. J.
(Feb.
24,
2013,
7:39
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323864304578320431435196910.html.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, FRIENDS, LOVERS, CHOCOLATE 32 (2005).
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See King, supra note 14, at 607.
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to this basic rule existed as well: for example, “hostile debts”94
and “war debts.”95 In 1927, the notion of “odious debts” emerged
and joined this list of exceptions.96
Alexander Sack, the world’s “preeminent . . . scholar on
public debt” during the late 1920s,97 coined the term “odious
debt” in 1927.98 He contended that a sovereign debt is “odious”
and should be cancelled if the following three elements are
satisfied: (1) the regime that incurred the debt was despotic, (2)
the purpose of the debt was against the needs or interest of the
state, and (3) the creditors were subjectively aware of the first
two factors at the time they granted the debt.99 The first prong
advocates on behalf of the people by shifting liability for the
debt from the state to the ruler personally, being based on the
principle that a ruler “who does not represent her subjects
necessarily lacks the legitimacy to act on their behalf.”100 The
second prong represents a causation requirement: not only
must the despotic ruler fail to work on behalf of the people, but
the people must have suffered from it. In contrast to the first
prong, the third prong takes into account the interests of the
creditors, by penalizing only those creditors “who actually knew
prior to extending debt that the ruler was ‘despotic’ and that [the
despotic ruler’s] expenditures would not benefit the State.”101
Although Sack was the first to create the term, several
theorists have developed their own versions of the odious debt
doctrine, differing from Sacks’ definition to varying degrees.102
Contemporary usage has focused on three basic factors: (1)
whether the population consented to the debt, (2) whether the
94

Generally, the idea of “hostile debts” is similar to that of “odious debt,”
although it predates the odious debt doctrine and is less doctrinally developed. See
Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1214-16.
95
“War debts” are debts contracted by government in order to defeat an
enemy. If the enemy overthrows the government, then the enemy is not expected to pay
back the debts that were intended to further its downfall. See Buchheit et al., supra
note 14, at 1212-14.
96
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 302.
97
Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy
in the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595, 598 (2008).
98
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 302.
99
See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND
THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165-66 (1991).
100
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 303 (citing Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at
1237-45 (finding that agency law can serve as a proxy for these concerns)).
101
See id. (citing ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165). It should be noted that this
note focuses on the first two prongs, since an inquiry into the subjective awareness of
Greece’s creditors would require new research which this investigation does not have
the access to undertake.
102
See King, supra note 14, at 621-33.
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population received any kind of benefit from the debt, (3) and
whether the creditor was aware of these facts.103 While each of
these elements may be interpreted individually in varying ways,
this overall structure and these terms represent the doctrine’s
most common form as used in scholarly discourses today.
For over a century, a number of countries have invoked
the doctrine of odious debt in some form. For example, in 1883,
Mexico repudiated as odious all debts incurred between 1857
and 1860 and between 1863 and 1867.104 Also, when the United
States took control of Cuba from Spain in 1898, the US refused
to pay Cuba’s debts to Spain, claiming that the debts were
odious because Spain had imposed the debt without the Cuban
people’s consent.105 A form of the odious debt doctrine found its
way to the International Court of Arbitration in 1923, when
Britain brought Costa Rica to court over Costa Rica’s Law of
Nullities, a 1922 law “that cancelled all contracts undertaken
by [its former dictator] from 1917 to 1919,” including loans
from a British bank.106 Chief Justice Taft upheld Costa Rica’s
law on the basis that the funds from the loan were not put to a
“legitimate use.”107
Although the odious debt doctrine was most recently
evoked in Iraq and Nigeria, both regimes ultimately declined to
enforce the doctrine for policy reasons. In 2003, after the fall of
Saddam Hussein, the United States originally declared Iraq’s
debt to be odious.108 But the United States later decided this
created a risky precedent and consequently dropped the odious
debt claim, choosing instead to negotiate with the Paris Club
for “an 80% cancellation of Iraq’s debts.”109 In a similar turn of
events, in early 2005, Nigerian President Olusegun Obsanjo
faced a request from the Nigerian Parliament to repudiate the
country’s debt, which was incurred largely during military
dictatorships. President Obsanjo decided instead to negotiate
with the Paris Club for a 60% reduction of the debt.110
The odious debt doctrine has received recent attention
in the context of Greece in light of its ongoing financial crisis.
103

Id. at 630-31.
See BENOÎT BOUCHAT ET AL., ECUADOR AT THE CROSS-ROADS: AN INTEGRAL
AUDIT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT 11 (Elizabeth Anne et al. trans., 2007), available at
http://cadtm.org/Ecuador-at-the-cross-roads.
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Among those who claim that Greece should invoke the odious
debt doctrine to cancel some or all of its staggering debt, the
creators of the 2011 documentary film, Debtocracy, stand out
with particular prominence.111 According to its directors,
Debtocracy received half a million views within a week of its
release and approximately one million views within its first
month.112 The arguments advanced in this film fall primarily
into two categories: (1) the “odious debt”-focused arguments,
claiming that Greece’s debt is “odious” because the state
government spent the proceeds without benefit to the Greek
people;113 and (2) the “odious regime”-focused arguments,
contending that the Greek government is “odious” for having
made poor business decisions on behalf of the nation,114
engaging in “shady deals,”115 and enacting socially repressive
measures against the people.116 In conclusion, Debtocracy
argues that this odiousness should permit the cancellation of
Greece’s debts under the odious debt doctrine.117 The arguments
advanced by Debtocracy will be discussed more in depth in Part
VI of this note. As of the writing of this note, there is no sign
that the Greek government has acknowledged the message
from Debtocracy.
As explained in the Introduction, this note seeks to
analyze the applicability of the odious debt doctrine within the
context of Greece’s economic crisis. This analysis will conclude
that the odious debt theory should not be used to release
Greece from its debts, based on three primary findings: (1) the
odious debt doctrine fails as a workable rule due to its inherent
doctrinal and administrative flaws, and therefore should not be
applied in general; (2) even if the odious debt doctrine were
applied, the serious policy risks that accompany its use mandate
111

The film Debtocracy has been distributed online and is available on a
number of websites. See Aris Chatzistefanou & Katerina Kitidi, Debtocracy, YOUTUBE
(May 12, 2011), http://youtu.be/qKpxPo-lInk [hereinafter Debtocracy]; see also Aris
Chatzistefanou & Katerina Kitidi, Greece has Woken Up to Debtocracy, GUARDIAN (July
9, 2011, 5:00 AM), www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/09/greece-debtocracy.
112
Id.
113
For example, Debtocracy criticizes the government for its excessive
spending, including the amount of loan proceeds spent on the 2004 Olympic Games.
See Debtocracy, supra note 111, at 1:02:00.
114
See infra note 179.
115
See infra note 180.
116
For example, the documentary criticizes the government’s implementation
and acceptance of the number of financial austerity measures, describing the effect of
these measures on the Greek people’s quality of life. “[T]he government has turned against
the people with harsh austerity measures.” See Debtocracy, supra note 111 at 28:53.
117
See id. at 1:08:00.
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a narrow interpretation of the doctrine, so as to limit its reach
to only exceptional cases; and (3) under a narrow interpretation
of the odious debt doctrine, Greece would not be eligible to
cancel its debt. The next three Parts will discuss each of those
findings in turn.
IV.

FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE ODIOUS DEBT
DOCTRINE AS A WHOLE

This Part will show how the odious debt doctrine is
plagued by doctrinal defects and administrative weaknesses,
which strongly discourage the doctrine’s general use altogether.
It should be noted for sake of clarity that while diverging views
exist as to the most appropriate interpretation of the odious
debt doctrine (e.g. narrow or liberal), the next Part will
introduce that discussion. Here, Part IV counsels against the
doctrine’s use as a whole, given its inherent flaws.
A.

Doctrinal Weaknesses

Given that its key terms are inherently vague and
unexplained, the odious debt principle is a doctrinally weak
concept. For example, the very heart of the odious debt doctrine
itself, the word “odious,” remains remarkably undefined. The
distinction between “odious debt” and the much broader
concept of “onerous debt” is often confusing.118 In particular,
great difficulty arises in attempting to discern the line between
debt that is “odious” and debt that is “‘merely’ . . . excessive,
burdensome, and difficult or impossible to service.”119 Other key
words in the odious debt doctrine are also ambiguous, including
the terms “absence of consent” in the first element and
“absence of benefit” in the second.120 The gaping doctrinal holes
left by these critical yet undefined terms make the odious debt
doctrine susceptible to self-serving interpretations and lack of
uniformity in application, among possible other dangers.121
Altogether, given these fundamental defects, the odious debt
doctrine fails as a workable and comprehensible rule.

118

Ochoa, supra note 13, at 152.
Id. (distinguishing between “odious” debt and “onerous” debt).
120
See infra Part VI.A.
121
Part VI will introduce the different ways the doctrine can be interpreted as
a result of this vagueness.
119
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Administrative Weaknesses

In the hypothetical case that the odious debt doctrine
were sufficiently unambiguous to qualify as a rule of law, its
enforcement would require some kind of authority to apply the
doctrine to the merits of each sovereign debtor’s case. As
Buchheit observes, were we to leave the judgment in the hands
of the lender, “the municipality of Rome would still be paying
off Caligula’s gambling debts.”122 The sovereign debtor is of
course equally unqualified to consider the merits of its own
odious debt claim, having “every economic motivation to paint
its predecessor in an unflattering light.”123 In solution, Sack
advocated the formation of an impartial, international tribunal to
enforce the doctrine.124 This analysis will show, however, how the
administrative technicalities involved in such an adjudication
process are exceptionally complicated—specifically the projects
of choosing qualified judges, ensuring impartiality, and
locating the necessary evidence.
One of the criticisms of Sack’s “impartial, international
tribunal”125 proposal is that the task of finding qualified judges to
assume such roles would be too difficult, if not virtually impossible.
For example, Bradley Lewis denounces the odious debt doctrine as
“judicially inadministrable[,] because it requires judges to answer
inherently political questions . . . .”126 Lewis found that judges
“simply cannot systematically distinguish between odious and nonodious governments.”127 Similarly, the author Tai-Heng Cheng
indicated that government successions are too political for a hardand-fast rule like the odious debt doctrine.128
Another criticism is that the requirement for “impartial
judges” may be a naïve expectation. In other words, not only
would an “impartial, international tribunal” require finding
judges qualified to be entrusted with international decisionmaking, but also without connections to the country in distress,
the countries of its creditors, and any countries who might be
adversely or beneficially affected by the result. Especially
122

Buchheit et al., supra note 14 at 1229.
Id.
124
Id. at 1223.
125
Id.
126
Lewis, supra note 11, at 305.
127
Id. at 308 (citing Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious
Regimes?, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 90 (2007)).
128
See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 123; see also Tai-Heng Cheng, Renegotiating
the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 21 (2007).
123
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considering our modern global economy—not to mention the often
international impact of sovereign bankruptcy—this presents a
daunting, if not impossible, task. Moreover, especially given the
uniqueness of every nation’s interstate politics and economics,
each new claimant under the odious debt doctrine may likely
require a new and specialized search for impartial judges.
Moreover, a question arises as to who or what authority
should decide those critical questions, initiate the process, and
determine the impartiality of the judges. Impartiality presents
an issue here as well, since allowing either the sovereigndebtor or the creditors to take over that managerial role may
raise a bias concern.
Even if an impartial tribunal were successfully
instated,129 the adjudication process still presents other
complications. For example, the need to show that a debt was
used for odious purposes would require identifying the uses of
the loan proceeds. But, as Christiana Ochoa points out: “[I]t
has been nearly impossible to uncover forensic information
about how despotic regimes actually finance themselves.”130 The
difficulties involved in discerning this vital information, not to
mention proving it to the tribunal, complicate this task
significantly. Another potential evidentiary complexity relates
to proof of the third prong of the odious debt doctrine: the
creditor’s subjective awareness of that the debts were for
odious purposes.131 The “subjectivity” of that element requires
an inquiry into the mind of the creditor specifically, which
presents a formidable evidentiary challenge for the sovereignclaimant. Absent any records of communication between the
sovereign-claimant and the creditor exhibiting as much, the
best or only proof of the creditor’s “subjective” knowledge may
be in the creditor’s own files. Considering that the sovereignclaimant requires this evidence in order to prove a claim
against the creditor, access to the creditor’s files for this
purpose may prove a nearly impossible task.

129

As a point of interest, the author Jeff King finds the broad concern over the
impartial tribunal concept to be overstated, believing there to be “ample precedents” of
such tribunals. See, e.g., King, supra note 14, at 653 & 666. King also dismisses the
task of interpreting the doctrine’s ambiguous terms as being “not beyond the
competence of what courts or tribunals can do or in fact have done and continue to do
in domestic law.” See id. at 666.
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Ochoa, supra note 13, at 131.
131
See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND
THE THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165-66 (1991).
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Notably, the impartial tribunal will likely confer a
degree of deference on the financial decisions of the state
officials who incurred the debt. The author King observes that
a tribunal instated to adjudicate under the odious debt doctrine
will probably use a standard of review that will “doubtless be
deferential to the views of public officials” and will likely deem
“only egregious examples of harmful conduct” as odious.132
Altogether, as with the doctrinal flaws, the administrative
defects involved with the odious debt concept counsel against its
use altogether, or at least favor its limited application.
V.

POLICY PROBLEMS OF A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION

This Part will introduce the note’s second finding: that
the odious debt doctrine should be interpreted narrowly because
liberal interpretations exacerbate serious policy concerns and
increase the risk of dangerous precedents. Even its creator
advocated for a restrictive application.133 According to Lee
Buchheit, Sack “would have recoiled at casually branding debts
as odious,” as some modern advocates attempt to do.134 After
investigating the serious policy risks that accompany a liberal
interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, this Part similarly
concludes in favor of a narrow application.
To this end, this Part first will explain how the odious
debt doctrine is commonly viewed through one of two lenses:
“odious regime” and “odious debt.” This first section will continue
to explain how these two approaches qualify as “narrow” or
“liberal” interpretations of the doctrine: narrow, in that the
interpretation would limit the doctrine to only a few, select
situations, and liberal, in that the interpretation would apply the
doctrine to a more expansive set of situations. The second
section of this Part will advance some of the policy concerns
associated with the odious debt doctrine, which increase
dramatically as the doctrine is interpreted more liberally.
Accordingly, this Part will conclude that because of the increased
132

King, supra note 14, at 666.
For example, when the Soviet government in 1918 claimed that it, a
government of “workers and peasants,” had the legal right to repudiate the debts
incurred by the former Russian “landlords and bourgeoisie” governments, Alexander
Sack openly balked at the proposal. See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223-24.
Furthermore, sometime after he proposed his odious debt doctrine, Sack wrote that
state public debts are a “charge upon the territory of the State”—that is, within the
financial responsibility of the state. Id. (citing Alexander Sack, The Juridical Nature of
the Public Debt of States, 10 N.Y.U. L. REV. 341, 357-58 (1932)).
134
Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223.
133
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policy problems associated with a liberal interpretation, the
doctrine should only be interpreted narrowly.
A.

Narrow vs. Liberal Interpretation of the Odious Debt
Doctrine

In order to examine the liberal and narrow
interpretations of the odious debt doctrine, the analysis must
first be divided into two parts: an “odious regime” and an
“odious debt” analysis. This division is necessary due to some
confusion about the very crux of the doctrine itself: the word
“odious.” The placement of this adjective has been a subject of
disagreement among scholars. One view, and the traditional
Sackian approach, would look for an “odious” debt and a
“despotic” regime.135 Despite this, recent scholarly discourse
reveals a tendency among other scholars to shift the modifying
“odious” adjective away from the word “debt” and instead
towards the word “regime”136—which dramatically changes the
application of the odious debt doctrine. Given these two
diverging approaches, the details of the “odious regime”
variation and those of the “odious debt” alternative will be
discussed in turn.
1. The “Odious Regime” Variation: A Liberal Standard
The “odious regime” approach does not require an
analysis of the sovereign’s debt at all but instead focuses solely
on the nature of the government, which allows this variation to
cover a more expansive set of situations.137 That is, if the state
can show its previous government to have been an “odious” one,
then all debts incurred by that odious government are liable to
be lawfully repudiated, regardless of their uses.138 Meanwhile,
under this logic, debts incurred by a virtuous government and
used for the same purposes would be upheld.
In short, by focusing exclusively on the nature of the
government, this standard could potentially cancel both odious
and non-odious debts, depending on the nature of the
135

See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66.
See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1223 (citing Anna Gelpern, Sovereign
Debt Restructuring: What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 391, 393 (2005); Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 47; Seema Jayachandran &
Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 85-87 (2006)).
137
See Buchheit et al., supra note 14 at 1222.
138
See id.
136
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government. This expansiveness shows the “odious regime”
standard to be a very liberal one.
2. The “Odious Debt” Variation: Interpreted Both
Liberally and Narrowly
The “odious debt” standard focuses on the debts
themselves, and attempts to distinguish between loans beneficial
to the people and loans used for personal enrichment.139 This
definition is more loyal to the original Sackian concept of the
doctrine of odious debt.140 This approach may also seem more
logically cohesive than the “odious regime” approach, because
the punishment (the cancellation of loans) has a direct, causal
relation to the injustice (the loans not benefiting the people).141
The “odious debt” standard is more complex than its
“odious regime” counterpart, because the elements of the
“odious debt” version are subject to both narrow and liberal
interpretations, while the alternative “odious regime” version
remains only a liberal standard.
For example, the phrase “absence of consent” in the
doctrine’s first prong can be interpreted both narrowly and
liberally. Sack meant to contain the odious debt doctrine to
despotic regimes only142—thus under Sack’s approach, since a
despot “does not represent her subjects,”143 the people’s lack of
consent is automatically presumed. His contemporary,
Feilchenfeld, expanded the odious debt doctrine to include debts
incurred without the population’s consent by any form of regime
but suggested the form of government may give rise to inference
of consent.144 For example, non-consent may be presumed in
139

See Bolton, supra note 127, at 83, 88. It should be noted that even when
applying the “odious debt” variation, the odiousness of the regime is still a relevant
question, as it can inform other elements. For example, if it were established that the
government was blatantly and prevalently known to be corrupt, this might shed light
on the third element: whether the creditors knew that the proceeds of their loans were
not serving the interests of the people. See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1226.
140
Sack himself stipulated that any debts contracted in furtherance of “the needs
or . . . interest of the State” must be considered non-odious. ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165.
141
In contrast, the “odious regime” approach punishes creditors with a
cancellation of loans, even in cases where the government was odious for reasons other
than the loan usage.
142
See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66.
143
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 303 (citing Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at
1237-45 (finding that agency law can serve as a proxy for these concerns)).
144
ERNEST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 704
(1931); see King, supra note 14, at 631 (analyzing what “absence of consent” might
mean to different forms of government, not just despotic ones, in other words
“parliamentary bod[ies] . . . elected on the basis of what are generally regarded as
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dictatorial governments, but in democracies, the people’s choice
to elect officials may evince the people’s “consent” to the elected
officials’ subsequent decisions.145 Feilchenfeld’s interpretation of
the “absence of consent” element is narrow, given that it likely
prevents democracies from invoking the odious debt doctrine.146
Alternatively, a liberal interpretation of “absence of
consent” treats that element as automatically satisfied by a
showing of the second element. In other words, proof of the
“absence of benefit” prong creates a presumption that an
“absence of consent” exists as well, based on the logic that a
population would naturally refuse to consent to something that
is not for their benefit.
This brings the discussion to the “absence of benefit”
element. The question of determining whether people felt the
“benefit” of a loan remains a subject of much discussion. Sack
also advocated a narrow meaning of “absence of benefit,”147
choosing to limit the term’s meaning to instances of despotic
self-enrichment: “When a despotic regime contracts a debt, not
for the needs or in the interest of the state, but rather to
normal majority rules,” “absolute government[s],” and “representative bod[ies] not
elected by the application of fair and normal rules”).
145
FEILCHENFELD, supra note 144, at 704.
146
Feilchenfeld’s interpretation aligns with Sack’s underlying principle for the
odious debt doctrine: namely, that a ruler “who does not represent her subjects
necessarily lacks the legitimacy to act on their behalf.” Lewis, supra note 11, at 302-03.
In other words, in a democracy, the elected officials are directly chosen by the people,
thus such officials would represent the people whenever making decisions in their roles
as such officials. See Thomas S. Wyler, Wiping the Slate: Maintaining Capital Markets
While Addressing the Odious Debt Dilemma, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 947, 967-68 (finding
that “[i]f a democratically elected regime, for example, contracted a debt for some
detestable purpose, it could not be deemed odious since it was not incurred by a despot”).
In a democracy, the elected officials are directly chosen by the people, thus such officials
would represent the people in perhaps the most direct way possible.
147
Indeed, a strict reading of Sack’s interpretation would constrain the odious
debt doctrine to an even narrower context, given that Sack places emphasis on whether
the debt was incurred for the benefit of the state, regardless of how the proceeds were
in fact used. See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 15-16; see also Gèunter Frankenberg
& Rolf Knieper, Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries: The
Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 12 INT’L J. SOC. L. 415, 428 (1984).
In other words, in cases where the loan was “contracted for the benefit of a state and
with general consent, but subsequently spent on items that are in fact of no benefit to
the population,” Sack would require the debtor state “to repay even in the absence of
benefit, for the debts were in fact incurred for the benefit of the state.” Khalfan et al.,
supra note 14, at 15-16. This approach finds the injustice of the “odious debt” to arise
from an abuse of rights when the debt was contracted, and not from the excessive
burdens to the regime successor. See Frankenberg & Knieper, supra, at 428.
Nevertheless, this note has uncovered limited scholarly attention to this extremely
strict reading of Sack’s approach and therefore, for the purposes of establishing a
narrow interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, rejects this strict reading in favor of
a more popularly-used narrow approach.
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strengthen itself, to suppress a popular insurrection, etc, [sic]
this debt is odious . . . .”148
Similarly, authors Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, and Bryan
Thomas also suggest a narrow interpretation by proposing four
pre-defined scenarios that would constitute prima facie cases of
an absence of benefit:
(1) where proceeds are spent for personal enrichment; (2) where the
proceeds are spent on arms or military expenses used in a manner
contrary to the interests of the population, (3) where the proceeds are
spent on infrastructure distributed in a severely discriminatory manner;
and (4) where the funds were used to promote oppressive institutions.149

Additionally, authors Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu
Gulati “point [out] that populations often do benefit” at least in
part from the “debt incurred by despotic regimes.”150 To the
extent that these populations have benefited, these authors
conclude that the “populations and creditors should share
liability” in a way that reflects the “relative blameworthiness
and benefits of each.”151 By restricting the “absence of benefit”
element to only pre-defined situations where the population
received no benefit at all from the loan’s proceeds, these
authors advocate a narrow interpretation of the term.
Because this note sets out to analyze the odious debt
doctrine through the lens of Greece’s debts, this analysis
requires an interpretation of “absence of benefit” that will be
liberal enough to encompass the ways the Greek government
used their loan proceeds, which include, for example, excessive
spending on the public sector and expenditure for the 2004
Olympics. For this purpose, this note proposes a liberal
interpretation of “absence of benefit” that includes the use of a
debt in a way that proves to conflict with the long-term interests
of the population, even if the population feels a short-term
benefit from the loans. This is more expansive than previous
interpretations because, traditionally, the odious debt doctrine
was limited to cases where the people received no benefit at all
from the loans. As will be discussed more in depth later, this
148

Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 14.
Id. at 45. The author expands on a third scenario (where “the proceeds are
spent on infrastructure distributed in a severely discriminatory manner”) in a footnote,
explaining that this is meant to mean “systematic discrimination such as apartheid,
rampant nepotism or corruption such as in Indonesia.” Id. at 45 n.181 (footnote omitted).
150
See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 122; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati,
Partially Odious Debts?: A Framework for an Optimal Liability Regime, 71 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48-49 (2007).
151
Id.
149
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liberal interpretation of “absence of benefit” would encompass
Greece’s situation because the government’s spending, including
that on the public sector and the 2004 Olympics, caused a longterm detriment to the Greek people, even though they initially
felt the benefits of those expenditures.152
B.

Policy Concerns Support a Narrow Interpretation

This section concludes that only a narrow interpretation
of the odious debt doctrine should be adopted because of the
serious policy concerns involved in the liberal versions. For
example, the subjectivity of the “odious regime” standard
threatens inconsistency in application, self-interested opinions
permeating the adjudication, and an inappropriate authority
deciding political questions.153 The “odious debt” standard also
comes with serious policy risks, including the risk of
incentivizing sovereigns to mismanage the country or to exploit
local resources as an alternative venue for financing,
disincentivizing lenders to lend, and discouraging sovereigns
from correcting the deficiencies in their regulatory systems
that produced their financial crises in the first place.154 While
these policy problems apply to the odious debt doctrine in
general, the risks increase dramatically as the doctrine is
interpreted more liberally.
As such, this section will first address the policy
problems with the “odious regime” variation of the doctrine and
then will look at the policy concerns associated with the “odious
debt” standard. Given the heightened policy concerns involved
in the liberal odious debt standard, this section concludes that a
liberal interpretation must be rejected in favor of a narrow one.
1. Policy Concerns Involving the “Odious Regime”
Standard
The overarching problem with the “odious regime”
variation is that it presents a dangerously subjective standard.
This approach is subjective because it requires a discernment
of what makes a regime “odious.” As one author opined:
“Odiousness—whether of regimes, individuals, or certain cooked

152
153
154

See infra Part VI.A.2.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.2.
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green vegetables—is a subjective concept.”155 As discussed
further below, a subjective standard not only threatens
inconsistent interpretations, but it also leaves the doctrine at
the mercy of self-interested opinions.
First, a subjective standard, such as the “odious regime”
approach, is undesirable because it threatens to yield
inconsistent findings as to what is “odious.” American civil and
constitutional case law has approached subjective standards
very warily because of the risk of inconsistent results, finding
that subjective standards yield results “as variable as the
length of the foot of each individual.”156 Toward this end, some
authors have suggested installing an impartial, international
tribunal to ensure consistent results across the board.157
However, even if an impartial tribunal were chosen to
promote some kind of uniformity in the “odious regime”
interpretation, the subjective judgment behind this standard
still risks self-interested opinions pervading the adjudication.
For example, leaving the definition of “odious” to subjective
impressions requires judges to make determinations about the
inherently political issues of diverse countries.158 This presents
the risk of ethnocentrism entering into the equation.159 For
example, to what extent may “odious” findings be based on the
principles of the judge’s culture? That is, if a government
mandates or encourages cultural practices that are criticized in
other societies, such as public beatings or female circumcision,
is that in itself enough to make the government “odious”? Are
all dictatorships automatically odious?160 Also, are certain civil
rights required of a non-odious government, and if so, which
ones?161 By requiring individuals to cast judgments on the

155

Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1228.
See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (3 Bing. N. C. 468, 475) (1837)
(Tindle, J. concurring) (choosing an objective standard over a subjective one, stating:
“Instead . . . of saying that the liability for negligence should be coextensive with the
judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of
each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a
regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe”). Also, American
constitutional law has struck down legislation that has based culpability on “wholly
subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal
meanings,” such as whether the defendant’s behavior was “annoying” or “indecent.” See
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008). Arguably, the word “odious” might
have an even less universal meaning than those impermissible examples provided.
157
See supra Part IV.B.
158
See Lewis, supra note 11, at 305 (citing Bolton & Skeel, supra note 127, at 83, 90).
159
See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1228.
160
See id.
161
See id.at 1229.
156
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practices of a society that is not their own, cultural biases will
likely play a role.
Altogether, given the purely subjective basis of “odious
regime” variation and its accompanying risks, these serious
policy concerns require rejection of this standard in favor of an
alternative interpretation.
2. Policy Concerns Involving the “Odious Debt”
Standard
Like the “odious regime” variation, the “odious debt”
approach involves significant policy risks, which increase
dramatically as the standard is interpreted more liberally.
One policy concern is that the odious debt doctrine
incentivizes despotism or government mismanagement. Through
its third prong, the doctrine directs the punishment for a
government’s odious spending on the lenders, a third party.
Thus, an international implementation of the odious debt
doctrine could easily strip from a corrupt ruler any lingering
incentives to refrain from contracting and spending loans for
self-enrichment purposes. In other words, despite the doctrine’s
moral and normative goals, the doctrine ironically encourages
despotic governments to continue their self-serving expenditures
at the people’s expense. Greece’s situation exemplifies this risk.
If Greece were permitted to cancel its debts through the odious
debt doctrine, this may promote moral hazard among other
sovereigns.162 That is, such precedent would incentivize devious
state officials to “work the system” by borrowing money
recklessly while at the same time either maintaining fiscally
unsound economic policies or deliberately overspending in
confidence that their mismanagement will ultimately entitle
the country to a cancellation of the loans. These risks call for a
very narrow interpretation of the odious debt doctrine so as to
eliminate these incentives.
Since the odious debt doctrine would discourage lending
to despots, another policy concern is that despots alternatively
will turn to “funds from sources that may harm” the country.163
By placing a burden on creditors, the odious debt doctrine
would prove a strong deterrence for lenders from engaging in
162

Cf. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1010 (2004) (finding a similar moral hazard risk is
involved in IMF lending and support packages).
163
See Ochoa, supra note 13, at 110.

1648

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:4

transactions with governments known to be despotic. If a
despot is deprived of borrowing from lenders, it may likely
resort to domestic means of financing its interests: for example,
sale of land or other valuable state assets,164 natural resource
extraction contracts, and other forms of foreign direct
investment (FDI).165 Such exploitations by the despotic
government would likely harm the country’s economic resources,
natural environment, and population at least as much as the debt
would.166 “Given the odious debt doctrine’s moral imperatives and
normative goals,” Ochoa writes, “it seems unreasonable to develop
a functional odious debt doctrine that will give despots cognizable
incentives to make yet more use of these (potentially more
harmful) methods of financing their regimes.”167 Thus, while
purporting to be a remedial measure, the odious debt doctrine
runs the risk of being equally or more destructive than the
situation it would attempt to circumvent. If Greece were allowed
to invoke the odious debt doctrine, the resulting precedent would
set the stage for this policy concern to become a reality.
Additionally, just the “absence of benefit” element alone
provides a substantial disincentive to lenders when interpreted
liberally. As defined earlier, a liberal application of “absence of
benefit” prong would expand the doctrine to encompass
situations where the population actually felt the benefits, so
long as these benefits eventually turned into long-term
detriments.168 The expansiveness of this term, however, would
place an enormous burden of foreseeability on lenders. In other
words, the liberal interpretation of the “absence of benefit” prong
requires lenders not only to predict how the borrowing state will
potentially use the loans but additionally to forecast the possible
long-term impact of those potential uses—a very demanding
burden. Given the high liquidity of the international lending
market,169 lenders would likely be easily dissuaded by this high risk
of investment loss and would choose to put their money elsewhere.
164

See id. at 131 n.115.
See id. at 131. For more information about FDI, see id. at 136.
166
For a more in-depth examination of these harms, see id. at 130-52.
167
Id. at 110.
168
This is exemplified by Greece’s “decade-long consumer and public sector
spending boom”: a series of short-term benefits to the people, all of which eventually drove
the country into bankruptcy. MANOLOPOULOS, supra note 10, at 21; see also supra Part II.
169
See Albert H. Choi & Eric Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine,
70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 36 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
lcp/vol70/iss3/4 (commenting on the high liquidity of the international lending market,
such that “investors should be able to find nearly as good opportunities” if dissuaded
from lending to dictatorial regimes).
165
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On a related note, these lender disincentives caused by
the odious doctrine would also negatively affect other countries’
financial opportunities.170 Countries “often need to finance
significant amounts of investment to foster the level of
economic and social development they desire”171 but usually
cannot afford such investments merely using domestic funds.172
These problems exist even more acutely for developing
countries. As such, opportunities to borrow in the private sector
play a very important role for these countries.173 A liberal
interpretation of the odious debt standard, however, critically
threatens these opportunities. As mentioned earlier, the third
element of the odious debt doctrine places a responsibility on
the creditor to detect and withhold funds from seemingly odious
governments.174 If the odious debt doctrine were interpreted
liberally, a widespread application would dramatically increase
the risk of investments in sovereign debt. Lenders would likely
respond to this increased risk by either refusing to extend loans or
by charging higher interest rates,175 which would likely deprive
other countries of advantageous borrowing opportunities.176

170

Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 136, at 1 (finding that the risk
presents when lenders, discouraged by illegitimate governments, stop lending to
“legitimate” governments as well).
171
See Brenneman, supra note 27, at 652.
172
Brenneman explains this further: “Savings rates are often low in such
countries, and export revenue is usually insufficient to meet financing needs. Often,
tax receipts do not cover budgetary outlays.” Also, while the World Bank and other
such entities offer “official development assistance” to an extent, “this source of
resources has been shrinking for many years.” Id. (citing César Calderón et al.,
“Determinants of Current Account Deficits in Developing Countries” 28 tbl.2 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2398, 2000), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2398;
Derek
Huang Chiat Chen, Intertemporal Excess Burden, Bequest Motives, and the Budget
Deficit, at 48 fig.2.1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3086, 2003),
available at http://go.worldbank.org/IC5I4ZMQ40.
173
See Brenneman, supra note 27, at 652 (citing Inaamul Haque & Ruxandra
Burdescu, Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response Sought from
International Economic Law, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 246 (2004)).
174
See ADAMS, supra note 99, at 165-66.
175
Choi & Posner, supra note 169, at 35.
176
Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 112, at 83 (finding that “[i]f creditors
anticipated [that they would not be] able to collect on [even] legitimate loans, the debt
market would shut down”). These authors present an interesting solution to the policy
problems of the odious debt doctrine: instead of designating an impartial tribunal to
adjudicate the matter after-the-fact, Jayachandran and Kremer propose empowering a
committee to determine only whether future loans to a government would be odious.
Thus, loans can be cancelled under the odious debt doctrine only if they were incurred
despite being labeled “odious” by the designated committee in advance. This proposal,
if adopted, would be too late for Greece’s situation, but nevertheless advances an
interesting theory.
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Finally, the odious debt doctrine may diminish or
eliminate the regime’s incentive to restructure their budget
and governmental system. In Greece’s situation, for example,
the need to pay its creditors will force the government to
fundamentally restructure its system of public expenditure.177
Allowing a release of debt could take away, or at least
discourage, the government’s incentive to do so.
Given the risks that accompany the odious debt
doctrine, it logically follows that an increase in the doctrine’s
invocation would yield an increase in the risk of these policy
problems. Since a liberal interpretation encompasses a more
expansive set of situations, therefore only a narrow application
of the odious debt doctrine is warranted in order to reduce of
the threat of these policy concerns,.
VI.

APPLICATION TO GREECE

Given the narrow and liberal interpretations of the
odious debt doctrine, this section will demonstrate that Greece
requires application of a liberal standard—that is, either the
“odious regime” standard or the liberal interpretation of the
“odious debt” standard—in order to qualify for release from its
debts. On the other hand, Greece would not be eligible under
the narrow interpretation of the “odious debt” standard.
A.

Greece Requires a Liberal Interpretation to Qualify

To reach its the conclusion that Greece is only eligible
under liberal interpretations of the doctrine, this Part
considers the arguments advanced by the creators of the
documentary film Debtocracy, who are foremost proponents of
Greece invoking the odious debt doctrine.178 As before, these
arguments are most clearly introduced by analyzing them in
turn under the “odious regime” standard and then under that
of “odious debt.”

177

See Alberto Mingardi, Greece and the National Moral Hazard Problem,
DAILY CALLER (July 1, 2011, 2:29 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/07/01/greece-andthe-national-moral-hazard-problem/ (finding that the Greek crisis constituted a “useful
lesson” that will bring the population of Greece to “demand a fundamental
restructuring of public expenditure,” whereupon Greece, “[f]orced to face the
truth, . . . might, paradoxically, end up better off five years from now than countries
where the political classes are disguising the need for reform”).
178
See Chatzistefanou & Kitidi, supra note 113.

2013]

ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE

1651

1. The “Odious Regime” Variation May Be Favorable to
Greece
Some of the arguments in Debtrocracy in favor of Greece
invoking the odious debt doctrine are based on the nature of
the government rather than on the use of the loan proceeds,
including evidence of the Greek government’s poor business
decisions,179 involvement in corrupt transactions,180 failure to
correct the widespread corruption problem in the country,181 and
implementation of austere financial measures to the detriment
of the people’s quality of life.182 These claims would find
relevance only under the “odious regime” standard because they
do not focus on the uses of the debt proceeds.183 As discussed
previously, the “odious regime” standard is a very liberal one,
given that it encompasses a more expansive set of situations.184
The question presented in this section is whether these
arguments would succeed under the “odious regime” approach.
This is a difficult question to answer, because the “odious
regime” standard turns on such a subjective term as “odious.”
Hypothetically speaking, on one hand, an impartial tribunal185
might agree that underhanded transactions and administrative
oversights might indeed make the government an “odious” one.
Additionally, it is even less clear whether a judge would find
that the Greek government was “odious” Greek government for
having made detrimental business decisions, as a judge may be
179

For example, the film addresses the Greek government’s failure to
maintain a budget, and criticizes the Greek government’s decision to become a part of
the EU, on the basis that Greece could not keep up with the competition between
Eurozone countries. One spokesperson compared the competition between Greece and
the more economically stable countries of the Eurozone to a “featherweight boxer” in
the ring with “Muhammad Ali.” Id at 13:05. The documentary also questioned the
Greek government’s decision to hire a former Goldman Sachs employee to lead the
Greek Public Debt Management Agency, on the basis that an employee of Goldman
Sachs was equivalent to a “criminal” and thus could not be relied on to handle Greece’s
financial affairs in the best interests of the state. Id. at 58:09. In another example, the
film criticized the government’s decision to import foreign military arms, especially
from Germany, even when during the financial crisis. Id. at 59:43.
180
Id. at 1:03:15. Debtocracy provides as an example the underhanded “cross
currency swaps” made by the Greek government in collaboration with Goldman Sachs
in order to hide the extent of Greece’s deficit from the EU, id. at 56:51, which was
discussed in Part II, supra. The film also mentions a scandal involving the German
electronics company Siemens, who contracted with Greece for inflated contract prices,
allegedly due to bribing certain Greek officials. Id. at 55:18
181
See Greek Corruption Booming, Says Transparency International, supra note 67.
182
See Chatzistefanou & Kitidi, supra note 113.
183
See supra Part V.A.1.
184
See id.
185
For a discussion about the theory of creating an international, impartial
tribunal to adjudicate the merits of each odious debt case, refer to Part IV.A, supra.
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inclined to follow a kind of “business judgment rule”
approach.186 In other words, a judge might prefer to presume
that the government’s business decisions were based on “sound
judgment,”187 rather than to question whether the government
engaged in “odious” breaches of its fiduciary duty to the people.
Even if a judge were to find the Greek government to be
guilty of “odious” conduct based on these factors, she would be
utilizing a very unconventional notion of “odious regime,” since
the term usually applies to despots or clearly self-serving
leaders.188 While some of the corruption may qualify as “selfserving,” other aspects of the deceitful behavior reflect
measures made for the advancement of the country, however
misguided or unethical they may seem. For example, the
elaborate spending on the public sector, in the form of public
sector wages and social programs (as discussed in Part IV),
reflects that loan proceeds went toward the needs of the people
and not to the Greek officials themselves. Even the Greek
government’s 2001 illicit method of gaining membership into
the Eurozone—while clearly underhanded—was performed to
benefit the country by gaining the highly beneficial interest
rates that the euro currency involved.189 Thus, under a
conventional notion of “odious” as described above, even this
grievous instance of deceitful conduct might not be considered
“self-serving” so as to qualify.
In short, since this standard remains an incredibly
subjective one, it does not offer a strong answer either way. For
the purposes of this examination, however, this note will assume
that under the liberal “odious regime” standard, an impartial
judge could subjectively conclude that Greece qualifies.

186

For more discussion on the business judgment rule, see Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that “[a] board of directors enjoys a
presumption of sound business judgment” and therefore “[a] court . . . will not
substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment”); see also
Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (holding that courts will not
examine “the wisdom of the [contested] decision itself,” but only whether the decision
was “reached by a proper process”).
187
Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp. supra note 186 at 49.
188
See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 14.
189
See supra Part II.A.
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2. While a Liberal Interpretation of the “Odious Debt”
Variation Is Favorable to Greece, a Narrow
Interpretation Is Not
As explained earlier, the “odious debt” standard involves
greater complexity than its “odious regime” counterpart due to
its potential for both liberal and narrow interpretations. This
section will demonstrate that only a liberal interpretation of the
“odious debt” standard would absolve Greece of its debt obligations.
Of the three elements of the odious debt doctrine,
Greece would fail the “absent of consent” prong under
Feilchenfeld’s narrow interpretation.” As discussed in Part V.A,
Feilchenfeld finds that a democracy triggers a strong presumption
of the people’s consent.190 Here, Greece was a democratic regime
during the time it contracted the vast majority of its loans,191 and
therefore under Feilchenfeld’s narrow interpretation, Greece
likely fails the “absence of consent” requirement as a result of
this presumption.
The next question is whether Greece would qualify
under a liberal definition of “absence of consent.” Under the
liberal approach, as discussed previously, “absence of consent” is
presumed when an “absence of benefit” is shown. Accordingly,
this particular examination turns on an analysis of the
differences between the narrow and liberal interpretations of the
“absence of benefit” element.
Turning to “absence of benefit,” the narrow interpretation
would exclude Greece. Greece incurred the majority of its loans
during the time that Greece’s social government ran deficits to
finance public sector jobs and social programs, such as pensions.192
190

See supra note 146.
See HELLENIC PARLIAMENT, THE CONSTITUTION OF GREECE, AS REVISED BY
THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION OF MAY 27TH 2008 OF THE VIIITH REVISIONARY
PARLIAMENT 7, 17 (Kostas Mavrias et al. eds., Xenophon Paparrigopoulos et al., trans.,
2008), available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf (stating that in 1974, “Greece came out of
[a] seven year long dictatorship” and entrusted the Fifth Revisionary Parliament “with
the task to shape the modern features of the democratic regime [in the new
Constitution],” which subsequently chose “as form of the democratic government that
of a republic” and thereafter describing the current form of government as a
“parliamentary republic” where “[a]ll powers derive from the People and exist for the
People and the Nation”); see also FEILCHENFELD, supra note 144, at 704.
192
See infra Part II. Regarding the “absence of benefit” prong generally, it
should be noted that this examination considers Greece’s debt situation as a whole,
with particular emphasis on the arguments promoted by the creators of Debtocracy and
other proponents of Greece’s debt cancellation. A closer analysis might reveal some
miscellaneous expenditures of which the population did not feel any benefit. But such
an investigation would entail the intricate and complex task of tracking every
191
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The years 2000–2009 reflected a time of particularly substantial
borrowing for Greece, during which Greece experienced “a
decade-long consumer and public sector spending boom.”193
Because the government spent the proceeds of these loans
directly on the people, including via social welfare and public
sector wages,194 the population indeed felt the benefits of these
loans. Thus, a strict reading of “benefit”—as promoted by Sack,
Ben-Shahar, Gulati, and other theorists—would reject a claim
that Greece’s debts are odious.
The spending on the 2004 Athens Olympics merits
individual analysis under the narrow “absence of benefit”
interpretation. Debtocracy and other proponents of Greece
invoking the odious debt doctrine argue that the government’s
elaborate spending for 2004 Olympics reflects an odious use of
loan proceeds without benefit to the people. But a significant
portion of the 2004 Olympics expenses went toward city
infrastructure development, including a new metro system, a
new airport, a tram, a light railway network, and a bypass
highway.195 These costs, as well as the expenses of the security
systems, undoubtedly conferred benefits upon the Greek people
more than anyone else. Other Olympics expenses, including the
construction of buildings and arenas, served a greater purpose
of improving the economy through tourism, one of Greece’s
primary industries196—which would create enough of a benefit
to qualify under the narrow interpretation of the doctrine.197 In
any case, the excesses spent on the Olympics clearly do not
resemble the narrowly-defined examples of “personal
enrichment” or “oppressive institutions” intended by Sack and

transaction by the Greek government over a large span of years—which information
this examination is unable to procure. As such, this note will instead choose to focus on
the aforementioned arguments advanced by Debtocracy.
193
See MANOLOPOULOS, supra note 10, at 21.
194
See Wallop, supra note 51.
195
See Derek Gatopoulos, Greek Financial Crisis: Did 2004 Athens Olympics Spark
Problems In Greece?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/06/03/greek-financial-crisis-olympics_n_598829.html.
196
Of the seven industries listed on the Greece webpage of the reference site
World Factbook, “tourism” is listed first and reportedly accounts for 15% of the nation’s
GDP. See CIA, supra note 56. Also, according to a 2010 report by the United Nations
World Tourism Organization, Greece hosted 14.9 million international tourists in 2009,
and is ranked as the seventh most visited country in the EU and sixteenth in the world.
See U.N. WORLD TOURISM ORG., WORLD TOURISM BAROMETER, Vol. 8, no. 2 (June 2010),
available at http://www.unwto.org/facts/eng/pdf/barometer/UNWTO_Barom10_2_en.pdf.
197
If a greater purpose of aiding tourism were not sufficient to justify any
elaborate expenses for Olympic events, then practically every host of the Olympic
games could routinely cancel their debts related to the games after the fact.
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other theorists.198 Altogether, Greece’s situation would not
qualify under the narrow definition of “absence of benefit.”
On the other hand, Greece would likely prevail under a
liberal interpretation of “absence of benefit.” Given that the
government’s lavish spending ultimately proved disastrous to
the people,199 this long-term detriment, despite the initially-felt
benefit, would qualify under a liberal interpretation of “absence
of benefit” element.
Furthermore, under the liberal approach, satisfying the
“absence of benefit” prong means that the “absence of consent”
element is also likely fulfilled. As discussed a few paragraphs
earlier, the liberal interpretation of the doctrine would find the
“absence of consent” prong satisfied upon an adequate showing
under the “absence of benefit” prong.
Altogether, because of the nature of Greece’s debt,
Greece requires either the liberal “odious regime” standard or
the liberal “odious debt” standard in order to successfully
invoke the odious debt doctrine. This analysis also shows that a
narrow interpretation of the “odious debt” standard would
exclude Greece from its protection. Therefore, since this note
favors the application of the narrow interpretation exclusively,
Greece should not use the odious debt doctrine to repudiate its
debt.
B.

Alternatives to the Odious Debt Doctrine

While this note argues that Greece should not be
permitted to invoke the odious debt doctrine, countries that are
“weighed down by a history of imprudent borrowings [are] not,
however, wholly without recourse.”200 Thus, this Part will advance
three alternatives to invoking the odious debt doctrine.201
One option, and perhaps the most obvious one, is simple
debt repayment. Of course, this seemingly perfunctory
suggestion may be impossible in some situations, but it
remains nonetheless a possible solution for countries whose
debt, though onerous, is not odious. Currently, the Greek
government has manifested its intent to repay its debt,202
198

See Khalfan et al., supra note 14, at 45.
See supra Part II.
200
Buchheit et al., supra note 14. at 1261.
201
Perhaps not all of these options are possible for Greece or in Greece’s best
interests, but a separate, more extensive study would be warranted to make that
determination.
202
See Allen et al., supra note 8.
199
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although it has required the cooperation of its creditors in
terms of time extensions203 and rescue packages.204
A restructuring of the debt is a second viable solution
for resolving debt repayment problems.205 As one commentator
points out, “[s]ince a sovereign’s creditors cannot liquidate or
seize assets to satisfy the debt,” as discussed previously in this
note,206 “[the creditors] must wait until the sovereign has
sufficient assets to satisfy its obligations,” which would entail
restructuring its payment of principal and interest.207 This
method also has its pitfalls, predominantly creditor holdouts,
moral hazard, and lack of coordination, which may impede an
effective restructuring.208 On the other hand, because
restructuring involves independent and private transactions—
as opposed to international dispute resolutions—it does not set
any precedent and avoids the risks associated with that effect.
A third alternative would be to declare bankruptcy
without invoking the odious debt doctrine. Although this recourse
avoids the dangerous precedent-setting risks of the odious debt
doctrine, it also involves numerous other complexities and policy
concerns. For example, in Greece’s case, one author rejects the
idea of a beneficial default, finding that
[Greece] would then no longer pay debt interest, but it would have to
close its primary fiscal deficit (the deficit before interest payments),
of 9-10 [percent] of GDP, at once. This would be a far more brutal
tightening than Greece has now agreed. Moreover, with default, the
banking system would collapse.209
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See Reuters, Greece Says Still Seeking More Time to Pay Off Debt, FOX
BUS. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/10/04/greece-says-stillseeking-more-time-to-pay-off-debt/#ixzz2PUz3ff88 (reporting that “[t]he Greek
government has asked for more time to implement painful reforms” and “allow euro
zone rescue funds to be used to recapitalize its banks” before repaying its debt).
204
See Abdul Ahad, EU-IMF Audit to Resume in Greece, BUS. RECORDER (Apr
3, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.brecorder.com/world/global-business-a-economy/113590eu-imf-audit-to-resume-in-greece.html (reporting that Greece’s “bailout, initiated in
2010, is over 20 times higher” than a “10-billion-euro ($12.8-billion) bailout” that the
EU, the IMF, and the European Central Bank discussed giving Cyprus in 2013).
205
See Buchheit et al., supra note 14, at 1261-62 (finding that “[t]he sovereign
debt restructuring process as it has evolved over the last twenty-five years is often not
pleasant—indeed, it is frequently exasperating, contentious, and attenuated—but it is
a recognized feature of the international financial system”).
206
See supra Part I.A.
207
Brenneman, supra note 27, at 662.
208
For a more extensive examination of these pitfalls of restructuring, see id.,
at 662-70.
209
Martin Wolf, A Bail-Out for Greece Is Just the Beginning, FIN. TIMES
(May 4, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de21becc-57af-11df-855b00144feab49a.html#ixzz1qNw4Y2N7.
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On the other hand, an investigation by Borensztein and
Panizza showed that the economic effects of a default are
actually short-lived, limited to at most a few years,210 which
would suggest that the economic costs of default for Greece
may not be as severe as commonly thought.211
These three options reflect just three of many possible
viable alternatives to the odious debt doctrine as solutions for
Greece’s situation. The years to come likely will prove which of
any possible solutions will serve Greece the best.
CONCLUSION
This note has set out to analyze the odious debt doctrine
within the context of Greece’s financial debt crisis and
ultimately arrived at three primary findings: (1) at a universal
level, the odious debt doctrine should not be applied because of
its critical inherent doctrinal and administrative failings; (2)
even if the odious debt doctrine were applied, it should be
interpreted narrowly, since a liberal interpretation of the
doctrine involves increased policy risks; and (3) under a narrow
interpretation of the odious debt doctrine, Greece would not be
eligible to cancel its debt. Therefore, Greece should not be
permitted to invoke the protection of the odious debt doctrine and
should instead resort to other solutions to resolve its debt crisis.
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